Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'fragments/reports' and 'Mere Possibilities'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
13007 Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
467 A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion]